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nonsite.org - Article - Issue #19
ACTION AND STANDING A
ROUND
CHARLES PALERMO
Some philosophers, like Roger Scruton, famously deny that a
photograph can be a work of art. On their views, whatever is
truly photographic is sheerly mechanical: it is dependent on the
objects of the world, not on the ideas, beliefs or intentions of the
photographer. Photography cannot make art, because there is no
way to  intend  something photographically. To help us grasp
what is essentially photographic, Scruton suggests we consider
what he calls an “ideal photograph,” which is (as he explains) a
“logical  ction.” The “ideal photograph” is the product of
photography stripped of all manipulation and reduced to what is
speci cally photographic. Some corresponding ideal could be
posited for painting. The ideal painting, Scruton explains, stands
in what he calls “a certain ‘intentional’ relation to a subject.”
Among other things, that means that it stands in a certain
relation to “a representational act, the artist’s act,” so that “in
characterizing the relation between a painting and its subject we
are also describing the artist’s intention.” “In characterizing the
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relation between the ideal photograph and its subject,” on the
other hand, as Scruton explains, “one is characterizing not an
intention but a causal process, and while there is, as a rule, an
intentional act involved, this is not an essential part of the
photographic relation.”  Because of this, your interest in a
photograph can always be reduced to an interest in what the
photograph pictures, which we’ll call (following some
philosophers) the “pro- lmic event,” or to some
nonphotographic manipulation of the photographic image after it
is formed. Your appreciation of the photograph can never be an
appreciation of it as a photograph, because there is no way for a
photograph to show something, precisely as it appears, exactly
because the photographer  means  what the photograph shows.
And that is because of the kind of action taking a photograph is,
on Scruton’s account. You can take a photograph intentionally,
but you cannot intend the photographic image itself. The image
is an unwilled, merely mechanical copy of the pro- lmic event.
It might be worthwhile to pause for a moment to consider the nature
of an action. In classical formulations of theories of agency, an action
has to stand in a certain relation to an intention. So, to take an old
example, let’s say a sound wakes me in the middle of the night, and I
go downstairs to investigate. I turn on the light in my living room
when I reach the bottom of the stairs, see nothing worth further
investigation, turn the light back off and return to bed. We can say
that turning the light on was an act and that I performed it.
If two burglars, who were hiding in bushes outside my door, waiting
to break into my house, saw the light and ran away, can we say that I
acted to frighten away the would-be burglars? No. Even though they
were frightened away by the light I turned on, as an act and through
my own agency, we cannot say that I performed an action in
frightening them off. I did not know they were there, and so could
not have intended to use the light to send them away. The right
relation to an intention is missing.
This, I take it is why Scruton will allow that taking a photograph is
typically an action, but that no feature of the ideal photograph can be
thought of as the product of the photographer’s agency. Making the
photograph is like turning on the light downstairs; the particular
qualities of the photograph are like the  ight of the panicked burglars
—outcomes that lie beyond the reach of my intentions.
1
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Curiously, the very analysis of photographic agency—or nonagency
—that makes Scruton want to rule out the possibility of
photographic art makes photography particularly exciting to
postmodernist artists and critics as an artistic medium. What they like
so much about photography is the way it attenuates authorial
intention. A recent special edition of the journal  Critical
Inquiry  featured essays about artists since the 1960s exploiting
photography’s “automaticity,” which they understand to be its
diminished form of agency. “Chance,” “mechanicity,” “accident”—
these are the terms that are valorized in this celebration of
photography since the time of what the literary critic Roland Barthes
in 1967 called “The Death of the Author.”
One of the artists featured in this special issue was Tacita Dean. She
makes  lms and uses still photography. Her most famous project,
and the topic of an essay by the art historian Margaret Iversen in this
issue of  Critical Inquiry, is a photo book titled  Floh.  That’s the
German word for “ ea,” and it is the title of Dean’s book because
she bought all of the photographs in it at  ea markets. The
photographs are accompanied by no text or other meaningful
intervention. The point is just to collect, arrange, juxtapose, in a
matter-of-fact way, this assortment of photographs Dean found and
bought.
Fig. 1 Tacita Dean, from Floh (2001)
Iversen explains that the way Dean  nds the photographs re ects the
artist’s commitment to chance.  Like the surrealist poet André
Breton, Dean values the chance encounter enabled by browsing the
 ea market for its ability to put one in touch with “external
3
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circumstances” (813). This openness to chance (815) is re ected in
the photographs themselves in two ways:  rst, they “are,” as she puts
it, “a regular inventory of technical errors” and, second, are damaged
in ways that show their availability, as objects, to “accidents” (813).
In the end, Iversen explains, “[i]t is as though the condition of the
medium were being explored by illustrating everything that can go
wrong” (813).
By saying that accidents in the making of the photographs and in
their preservation reveal the “condition of the medium,” I take
Iversen to mean that chance is essential to photography—speci cally
analogue photography. “Of course,” Iversen quali es herself,
artists using analogue  lm exercise considerable agency
selecting camera and  lm, in framing, focusing, and
setting aperture size, time of exposure, and so on, as
well as similar choices throughout the printing process.
Yet, … all these forms of intervention do not
compromise the analogue’s photo-chemical continuity
with the world. The analogue is de ned as a relatively
continuous form of inscription involving physical contact
(797).
Projects like  Floh  thematize this openness to the world. The
haphazard quality of  Floh’s photographs and the variable state of
their preservation, Iversen argues, “associate analogue photography
with a kind of attentive exposure  to things in the world marked by
chance, age, and accident” (799).
Strange as it seems, then, the photograph that best exempli es the
medium of photography turns out to be a bad photograph. It helps,
of course, to  nd it by browsing and it doesn’t hurt if it’s a little
worse for wear, but the as-it-were formal guarantee of photography’s
openness to the world is an unambiguous “inventory of technical
errors.” Errors show the withdrawal of the photographer’s intention
from the photo-chemical contact between the  lm and the world.
Iversen explains that Dean courts this withdrawal in her  lmmaking
practice by setting up wide-angle static shots and holding the frame
until the  lm runs out. Dean explains: “It is just allowing the space
and time for whatever to happen, and that comes very much from
the nature of  lm” (817).
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In a certain sense, this is the opposite of what Iversen says about the
 ea-market photographs. If what Iversen likes about the  ea-market
photographs is that they’re full of errors, the great thing about the
static shot as Dean does it, is precisely that nothing can go wrong.
She’s out to  lm just exactly whatever happens. But in another way,
Iversen’s being perfectly consistent. Cherishing technical errors in
snapshots is just another way of avowing an interest in photography
by embracing the absence of authorial agency in the photograph.
And nothing can go wrong in the shooting of a  lm if all you really
care about is showing that whatever ends up in the  lm is
indifferently okay with you precisely because the project has nothing
to do with what you wanted to show. The tautological embrace of
whatever happens and the valorization of what the photographer
does accidentally amount to the same thing—a positive revaluing of
photography’s ability to keep authorial intention out the picture, so to
speak.
Dean and Iversen essentially reproduce Scruton’s account of
photography. The big difference is that, since they are
postmodernists, they are not troubled by art without authorial
intention or agency. Or, perhaps it would be better to say that, rather
than no agency, the artist in Dean and Iversen’s mode has agency—
even Scruton will allow that taking a photograph is an action—but
the artist has a diminished or attenuated agency. One that extends to
getting the photograph, but not to what the photograph looks like.
Since, at least in our present paragon, Dean’s book Floh, this mode
of getting is shopping, let’s call the mode of photographic agency
they offer photography-as-buying. You pay your money; you get a
photograph. What the photograph shows—its subject, its technical
errors, its wear and age—are not the outcome of your action. The
artist didn’t make them, and so the artist cannot mean them. In my
view, as in Iversen’s, buying a photograph is a pretty neat metaphor
for this view of photographic agency, and it is one she shares with
Scruton and Dean.
I don’t share it with them. I don’t think it’s right. Dawn Wilson has
recently offered a criticism of Scruton’s account of photography.
Roughly, Wilson argues that, even without retouching (or some other
nonphotographic manipulation), a photograph could indeed be made
to show something that looked different from the pro- lmic event.
She argues that the making of a photograph is a multi-stage process
that includes key decisions about processing and materials and that it
includes them not incidentally, as Scruton and Iversen treat them, but
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constitutively. Otherwise, holding an empty frame up to the space
before one’s eyes could count as a photograph.  Thus we have a
multi-stage event—the photographic event—that includes a “merely
causal relation” to the pro- lmic event and another part that may
permit this “causal phenomenon” to “be mastered and creatively
exploited by skilled artists” (“Photography and Causation,” 340).
Thanks to this mastery, the photograph can, perhaps, come to stand
in an “intentional relation to the subject” because the “causal relation
places no constraints on what a photograph may depict.” I take this
to mean that the photographic image’s causal relation to its subject
does not necessarily determine what the photograph looks like; a
skilled artist may be able to harness it to an intention and so make
the photograph “transparent to human intentionality” (“Photography
and Causation,” 340).
Fig. 2 Dawn M. Wilson, Photograph (n.d.)
Wilson gives an example of a photographic event that produces a
photograph that does not look like the pro- lmic event—a
photograph of a moving train made with an exposure time too long
to show the train clearly. It appears as a blurred streak, instead.
Certainly, the resulting photograph is “transparent to human
intentionality”—at least if we can understand Wilson to have
intended to make a colorful photographic abstraction rather than a
picture of a train. The guarantee of the transparency of Wilson’s
photograph to her intention is its difference in appearance from the
actual pro- lmic event. It proves it means—that the picture stands in
an intentional relation to the photographer’s action—by  failing  to
resemble a train.
5
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Fig. 3 Walker Evans, Alabama Tenant Farmer Wife (1936)
I want to offer another example, one that supports Wilson’s thesis,
but not because the photograph fails to resemble the pro- lmic
event; rather, this photograph conveys a vivid impression of its
subject. This is a very famous photograph by Walker Evans of Allie
Mae Burroughs, one of the tenant farmers who hosted Evans and his
collaborator, James Agee, in 1936 while they stayed in Hale County,
Alabama, to research and document a story for  Fortune magazine.
That project, which resulted in the modernist masterpiece  Let Us
Now Praise Famous Men, was reviewed by Lionel Trilling shortly
after its appearance in 1941. “Evans’ pictures,” he writes,
are photographic in the sense that people mean when
they say “merely photographic,” they are very direct,
they even appear to be literal, and how the moral quality
gets into them I do not exactly know; I suppose it is
because Evans wants it to be there.6
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Not quite a page later, Trilling tells us that part of the picture’s
greatness is the sitter’s refusal to “be an object of your ‘social
consciousness’; she refuses,” Trilling continues, “to be an object at all
—everything in the picture proclaims her to be all subject”
(“Greatness,” 376-77).
Trilling shows how alive he is to the problems of photography. To
speak of a picture being “merely photographic” or “literal” is
Trilling’s way of alleging that it is simply a record, a mechanical
record of the pro- lmic event. But he is careful to indicate that this is
merely a common usage—just the way people speak about certain
photographs. What he calls the moral quality gets in there, though,
somehow. To put it in philosophical terms, Trilling supposes the
photograph, literal as it is, to be transparent to Evans’ intentionality, at
least where that moral quality is concerned.
But then, Trilling almost immediately reverts to something Scruton
might say, giving all the credit for expression to the sitter. If she is
not an object at all, she is a subject. That is, she is the one with the
agency, not Evans, and our interest in the photograph turns out to be
in the sitter, in the pro- lmic event, after all. Who expresses him- or
herself in this photograph—Walker Evans or Allie Mae Burroughs? If
Burroughs is “all subject” are we to understand this photograph the
way Scruton understands an ideal photograph?
Let me propose another possibility. If Evans is to have agency in the
photographic event, that agency need not consist in preventing the
photograph from resembling the pro- lmic event. That was Wilson’s
strategy in the photograph of the blurred train. Her strategy might
make a case for photographic agency in a much wider  eld of
photographic work if we apply it to straight photographs like Evans’.
In other words, photographic agency might not consist only in
making a photograph look different from the pro- lmic event. It
might consist in securing  its resemblance to the pro- lmic event in
respect to some quality the photographer means to record, even
quite literally.
When Trilling notes the similarity of the sitter’s mouth and eyebrows
and  ne wrinkles to the contours and texture of the boards behind
her, he is noting features of the real objects in the picture, which a
photographer of Evans’ masterful skill can make simultaneously
visible, and even pictorially signi cant in their similarity, where a
lesser photographer would very possibly fail. That Evans’ photograph
revealed to Trilling the importance of wear and age, distress and
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wearing out, makes it specially suitable for embodying these themes,
which are central to Agee’s text. Thus, Evans expresses a thought in
even such a “merely photographic” image.
As I say, I have introduced this reading of a single photograph not
against Wilson, but to propose that agency in photography can
consist in making the photograph depict the pro- lmic event
“merely” photographically, as in Scruton’s “ideal photograph.” And
this is valid for the reason Wilson indicates: that, in the making of a
photograph, there is so much room for agency that even the most
literal depiction cannot be ruled out as the outcome of an expressive
action. Even though a similarity exists between Burroughs’s face and
the boards of her shack, a photographer who wants it to count
pictorially will think hard about placing and lighting the sitter, about
lens, aperture, and exposure time, about the choice of paper to print
the photograph on, and other things, too.
Indeed, even to notice the similarities between the wear in
Burroughs’ face and the wear of the boards of her shack would
require a kind of artistic and speci cally photographic insight. Her
face will have been full of tans and reds and other hues. The boards
of the shack will have been the gray of weathered and unsealed pine.
She would surely have been animated by the mobility, intelligence,
and emotional presence of a real person; the shack’s wall would have
shone silently in the summer sun—a thing against which to see other
things, not an interlocutor. For Evans to have constructed the
metaphor he then captured by his skill in mise-en-scène and
photographic technique—this is, taken altogether, the kind of
expressive space Wilson imagines for the photographer’s agency
within the photographic event. Even when the photographer’s aim is
to produce a photograph that renders literally and makes pictorially
effective certain features of the pro- lmic event.
Of course, it might have happened by chance. Evans might have set
Burroughs against the wall without thinking of any kind of visual
rhyme, so to speak, between her face and the wall. And, unlikely as it
might seem, the light and his camera’s settings might have been just
such that the likeness appeared by itself, unnoticed, perhaps, until
Trilling spotted them. One might also say that, Wilson’s argument
notwithstanding, a blurred train is surely the subject of countless
photographic mishaps, too. Does the—admittedly small—chance that
Evans’ photograph of Burroughs was a happy accident mean that
Scruton was right, after all? Does it mean that a photograph can only
ever be merely the equivalent of pointing at the pro- lmic event?
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No. In fact, the possibility only underscores what I’ve been saying all
along. If we want to argue that a photograph is to be a vehicle for
meaning, we must put the photograph in some intentional relation to
its author. Worrying that something might be meaningless because it
might be nothing more than an accident is just a way of insisting on
the centrality of intention to agency.
So what we need is an account of agency that is suitable for a
meaningful photography. The account we have already seen—
photography-as-buying—won’t do. Rather than emphasize the
agency of the photographer, it likens the photographer’s place in
photography to a customer’s place in a  ea market, where one might
buy a little packet of old photographs just to see what one gets in
something like the way Dean sets up a camera to see what happens.
What results may be interesting or evocative, but it won’t be an act of
expression. If we want photography to be a vehicle for genuinely
photographic acts of expression, we need a different account of
photographic agency.
Really, what we need is to imagine a different relation between
intentions and outcomes. The advantage, and the failure, of the
postmodernist account—what we called photography-as-buying—is
that the relation of the act—buying—and the outcome—the
photograph—is one of indifference. Just like Iversen’s account of
Dean’s  lming whatever happens, where the point is to let the
mechanical openness of photography to whatever happens deliver
just that. The problem with buying as a model for photographic
agency—or for artistic agency more generally—is the indifferent
relation between buyer’s intention and the outcome. To put it slightly
differently, buying cannot happen and fail. If I buy something, I may
be sorry later, but that doesn’t mean I didn’t buy it. By contrast, if I
make a work of art, and, looking at the  nished work, decide it does
not embody anything I can mean, I can say the making failed.
Maybe we need an economic model that captures the essence of
artistic agency better than does buying. The Victorian intellectual
Herbert Spencer wrote an account of the history, origins and nature
of economies in his Principles of Sociology. Spencer attacks what he
takes to be the typical conjecture about the origins of economic
exchange—that it begins with “barter.”  Spencer goes on to explain
his theory that the root of economic exchange is “certain ceremonial
actions originated by the desire to propitiate,” or to win favor with
someone (388). The example he uses to make familiar to his reader
this kind of ancient ceremony is what he calls “swopping,” which is
7
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to say, the practice of buying rounds among groups of men drinking
in bars. “We have here, indeed,” he says, “a curious case, in which no
material convenience is gained, but in which there is a reversion to a
form of propitiation from which the idea of exchange is nominally,
but not actually excluded” (391). Exchange is not “actually excluded,”
of course, because once you’ve bought, or “stood,” your round, you
clearly expect someone to buy the next, and so on, until everyone is
even, as if he’d been buying his own drinks all along. So in effect, it’s
just like buying your own drinks. That is why Spencer can say that
no material convenience is obtained by swopping. Seen from a
distance, so to speak, it’s just a way of buying yourself drinks. The
difference, however, is that you may buy your round but not  nd
yourself treated to a round in return. Your expectation of reciprocity
is internal to the act of swopping, and yet, you may successfully stand
your companions a round without that expectation being ful lled. It
is like buying, except that, even when the act is fully accomplished,
you don’t necessarily get what you paid for.
The great Victorian photographer Peter Henry Emerson regarded
Spencer as a kind of intellectual hero.  And Emerson suffered a kind
of crisis of faith in photography. The details are too much for this
conclusion, but he was worried that there wasn’t enough room for
the photographer’s agency in the making of a properly photographic
picture. In fact, after fulminating about the kind of work that could
count as properly photographic for several years, Emerson’s crisis led
him to renounce photography as an art. He nevertheless continued
for several years to publish photographic books. Actually, I don’t
think he ever stopped wrestling with the question of photographic
agency.
Fig. 4 Peter Henry Emerson, Low Water on Breydon (1890)
So it strikes me as deeply important that, just as he was preparing to
renounce photography as art, he published a photo book framed by a
story about buying and selling. The book, Wild Life on a Tidal Water,
8
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recounts the adventures of Emerson, his friend, the painter T.F.
“Dick” Goodall, and their factotum, “Joey,” who works for them on
their houseboat on the broads near Great Yarmouth.
In the  rst chapter, Joey is frying some  sh for Emerson and Goodall.
Emerson is so pleased at the quality of the  sh that he asks Joey how
much he paid for them. Joey responds that they cost “a shillun’,” and
Emerson tells him to keep them at that price. Joey goes back into the
kitchen and then reappears, agitated, to say that he’d shopped widely
to  nd a good bargain, which was why he was so long in town that
morning. Emerson and Goodall think they understand why Joey was
defensive about his long shopping trip—they knew he liked beer, so
they assumed that he’d been drinking on his shopping trip.
The book ends with a coda to this opening anecdote. Joey has been
dismissed, and Emerson has returned to London, where he receives a
letter from Goodall, who thinks he can explain Joey’s good luck in
 nding  sh. He had been in town with the new hired man, Ben,
searching for  sh to equal Joey’s. They are discussing the problem in
the street when they are approached by a man who claims he can
help them. The man leads them to a pub. Puzzled, Goodall and Ben
watch the stranger, who is the landlord of the pub, pull a sole and a
skate from behind the bar and give it to them. Goodall asks how
much the landlord wants for the  sh. Goodall relates the exchange
that follows:
“He said, ‘Give me what you like; I don’t want them.’
“I declined, and pressed for a price, but with no result;
so I stood him a drink, and Ben a drink, and myself a
drink. This ceremony over, I said, ‘How much for the
lot now?’
“’O, give the little girl something, and take ‘em.’
“At last, after much pressing, he named a ‘shillun’, and
we dealt.” (WLTW, 121-22)
Goodall asks the landlord how he gets the  sh. He answers that the
 shermen leave them as gifts, and he ends up with more than he can
use. Goodall immediately surmises that Joey got his  sh the same
way and drank his “shillun’” at the bar each week. The landlord
positively identi es Joey from Goodall’s description, and Goodall
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reports his conclusion to Emerson, who accepts it and asks if we, his
readers, do not agree that the mystery of Joey’s “festive manner on
 sh days” has been solved.
I want to propose that Emerson has constructed this story to show a
relation between intentions and outcomes, between expectation and
causation. Emerson and Goodall think they are buying  sh—
understood as receiving  sh because they have paid money for them
via an agent, Joey. In fact, however, they are standing Joey a round or
two at the pub, and he is reciprocating by regifting them a windfall
of  sh. The theme of ceremonial gift-giving is repeated,
ostentatiously, in Goodall’s account of his attempt to buy the  sh
from the barman. (He is permitted to pay for the  sh in the end, but
only after standing a round and being encouraged to give a little girl
some change. The girl, by the way, receives no other mention in the
story, and so is presumably to be thought of as some lesser  gure in
the pub—a bar-back, perhaps—and exists only to supply a target for
unmotivated, and therefore ceremonial, gift-giving.)
This might distract us from photographic agency and tempt us to
think about the nature of buying qua act. If I give another person a
certain amount of money called a price for a commodity, and they
give me what I ask in return, precisely on the condition that I give
them the price of it, we will typically say I have bought something.
Just like Tacita Dean in a  ea market. Success is tautological.
Swopping is different, as we’ve noticed—although an expectation of
reciprocity is built into it, it can be successfully accomplished without
that expectation’s ful llment. The outcome stands in a certain relation
to an intention—neither tautological nor indifferent. This is, I would
claim, much more like art making as we have always understood it
than buying is.
Think of painting. Now, Scruton, in discussing painting, said our
understanding of such a work of art always led us back to the artist’s
intention so that “in characterizing the relation between a painting
and its subject we are also describing the artist’s intention.” Let me
note, however, that he is far from saying that painters can make the
paintings they want to make just by intending them. They bring
expectations to the act of painting, and perform actions in making
paintings, but their expectations may go unmet. Just as in swopping.
Emerson explains this in a series of propositions on art from the
1899 edition of Naturalistic Photography. This work was written in
the depths of Emerson’s crisis. In his Proposition XII, a painter and a
photographer set out to picture a stretch of shore:
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The photographer at once sets up his machine, focuses
and exposes; but in these very processes  his  ideal
has  gone. What results  may  be beautiful, but it is no
more the representation of his ideal, the vision he  rst
saw. It is something else, for the machine imposes
certain conditions which were never in the
photographer’s mind at all.
In this, according to Emerson, the photographer is different from a
painter. For the painter, “each touch helps to his desired or ideal end
. . . everything is done unto one end, and all is certain from the  rst .
. .” (I:185-86). That is because the painter’s work is guided by his or
her intention at every step. That leads Emerson to say a painted work
is “a perfect index of its creator’s mind.”
And yet, Emerson himself explains why this is not so. The key
criterion of artistic success for Emerson is the full expression of what
he calls a “sense of beauty” or the “ideal.” But this “sense of beauty”
“will vary with individuals and in the individual from day to day, nay,
from hour to hour” (I:182). So, painting isn’t so certain after all. As
the painter proceeds, no matter how  ne the original inspiration, his
or her intention may vary, resulting in a work that does not
correspond to the original intention or even to any of the shifting,
partial intentions that informed and are indexed by the marks that
make up the  nal work. This seems like what I have in mind if,
looking at a student’s clumsy  nished painting, I say (or more likely,
think silently) he didn’t pull it off. He didn’t manage to perform all
the little intentional acts that add up to the realization of an original,
or at least integral, intention. The manugraphic character of painting
isn’t enough to make it so transparent to an intention as to make it
“certain.” Or even, to make it different from photography in this
respect.  You can’t make the picture you want to make by intending
to make it. Not with a camera, not with a paintbrush.
If I understand Emerson correctly, his allegory of photography
contends that, while photography make look like shopping at a  ea
market, it’s really more like standing a round at the bar. This is
important because, as we have seen, if all is certain from the start, as
in buying as we commonly understand it, the relation of intention to
outcome is taken to be tautological. So the outcome cannot be
understood as the successful embodiment of the artist’s meaning. If
the act is left open to chance, so that the outcome is indifferently
acceptable, it can’t be understood as the successful embodiment of
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the artist’s meaning, either. Only a model of photographic agency like
the one Emerson proposes as it were allegorically can help us
understand how we make photographs we mean.
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